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THE WHAT, WHY, AND HOW OF
PRIVATIZATION: A WORLD BANK
PERSPECTIVE
MARYM. SHIRLEY*
Ms. Shirley outlines privatization, defining the concept and suggesting why priva-
tization should occur and how it can be best implemented She first defines priva-
tization as the transfer of ownership of assets to the private sector. She then
discusses why a government should privatize, as opposed to why governments often
want to privatize. Finally, Ms. Shirley discusses various steps governments should
take in effectuating privatizations.
INTRODUCTION
p RIVATIZATION is much in the news today-and well it should be.
The acceleration of interest in privatization evident in the last two to
three years is striking. Governments of very different political and ideo-
logical streams are bent on privatizing, and governments that are already
privatizing are moving from selling small retail outlets and industries to
selling larger mining and infrastructure enterprises. The World Bank's
interest in privatization stems from its fundamental goals-to help its
borrowers achieve efficient growth with equity, while reducing poverty
and protecting the environment. Privatization can be an important
means to these ends.
Three questions about privatization should be addressed. The first
question is twofold: what is privatization and what is happening in
privatization? The second important question with respect to privatiza-
tion is, why should you privatize? Finally, the question of how to priva-
tize must be addressed.
* Mary Shirley is the Chief of the Public Sector Management and Private Sector
Development Division of the World Bank. Previously, she was the World Bank's Public
Enterprise Advisor. She is the author of several World Bank's studies on SOEs, includ-
ing Reform of State-Owned Enterprises, Divestiture in Developing Countries (with Elliot
Berg), ManagingState-Owned Enterprises, Public Enterprise Reform: The Lessons of
Experience (with John Nellis), and numerous country studies. She previously held posi-
tions in the Bank's Latin American and Caribbean Programs, the Organization of Ameri-
can States, the University of Bogota, and the Harvard Economic Research Center. She
has a Ph.D in economics. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in
this paper are entirely those of the author and should not be attributed in any manner to
the World Bank, to its affiliated organizations, or to members of its Board of Executive
Directors or the countries they represent.
This article is based on an address given by Ms. Shirley on November 21, 1991, as part
of the Fordham University School of Law Graduate Colloquium 1991-1992, Transna-
tional Financial Services in the 1990s.
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I. THE "WHATS" OF PRIVATIZATION
There are two "what" questions on privatization: What is privatiza-
tion? And what is currently being privatized?
A. What Is Privatization?
There are as many definitions of privatization as there are analysts.
For our purposes, privatization is the transfer of ownership of assets to
the private sector. Increasingly, countries are experimenting with ways
of transferring management without transferring ownership-through
management contracts and leases-and are trying to simulate privatiza-
tion-by making public enterprises act as if they were private. Both are
interesting, but both differ in real ways from the transfer of property
rights over assets to a new, private owner.
All types of privatization have the potential to increase so-called static
efficiency-what economists like to call X-efficiency-which means push-
ing enterprises to operate cost effectively on their production frontier.
Only by privatizing property rights, however, can you bring dynamic effi-
ciency-in other words, new investment, or innovation. Leases and con-
tracts do not stimulate dynamic efficiency, because they do not create
stakeholders with a clear interest in putting their own funds at risk.
B. What Is Being Privatized?
There are virtually no limits on what can be privatized. This is evi-
denced by the number of enterprises recently privatized. Graph 1 shows
that almost 7,000 enterprises have been privatized since the early 1980s. I
These privatizations are liquidations and sales that transfer assets to the
private sector. The graph excludes re-privatizations (the return of na-
tionalized enterprises to their former owners, which was important in
Chile and Bangladesh), as well as management contracts, leases and the
sale of minority shares. Also excluded are the sales of small retail outlets
in Eastern Europe that number in the thousands and would make the
graph look very different.
As the graph shows, the former East Germany takes the lead with
4,500 enterprises privatized.' Among developing regions, Latin America
is an important privatizing region; it has sold or liquidated over 800
firms.3 Within that region, Mexico (433) and Chile (261) are the most
active in privatization. Eastern Europe-excluding East Germany-has
privatized some 805 enterprises. Africa is next (373), followed by Asia
(122).
Of course, examining the numbers of enterprises privatized says noth-
ing about the magnitude of the sales. Instead, consideration must be
1. See app., Graph 1.
2. See id.
3. See app., Graph 2.
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given to the cumulative gross proceeds as a percent of 1990 Gross Do-
mestic Product ("GDP") to comprehend the magnitude of these priva-
tizations. Although these numbers are available for only a handful of
countries, they are quite revealing.4 Graph 3 shows that Chile reduced
the number of enterprises by seventy-five percent, and the proceeds were
a whopping twelve percent of GDP. Jamaica, by selling fourteen percent
of its firms, raised the equivalent of 5.8 percent of GDP. By contrast,
Mexico sold almost forty percent of its enterprises, but the gross pro-
ceeds were only 3.5 percent of GDP. The disparities in the proceeds of
privatization as a percent of GDP can be explained by the fact that Mex-
ico has been selling small firms; only recently has Mexico begun to sell
larger enterprises such as airlines, banks, and the telephone company.
What do sales mean in terms of total state-owned assets? Graph 4
shows that the United Kingdom has reduced its state-owned assets by
thirty percent; Mexico by only half that.5
II. WHY PRIVATIZE?
A. Reasons Why Governments Should Privatize
Although there are many reasons why governments may want to
privatize, the focus must remain on why they should privatize. Specifi-
cally, there are three reasons why governments should privatize.
1. Privatization Improves the Use of Public Resources
Nations can privatize in an attempt to improve the use of public re-
sources. The Finance Minister of Mexico uses a very telling example to
illustrate how privatization can improve the use of public resources.
Although only two percent of the Mexican population has ever flown, the
Mexican government, in an effort to upgrade the fleet of its national air-
line, paid an amount that could have covered the cost of paving over half
of the nation's unpaved roads. In addition, he goes on to note that the
accumulated losses of Mexico's large public steel mill now exceed ten
billion dollars. With a fraction of that amount the state could provide
potable water, sewerage, hospitals, and education to the poor in every
community in Southeastern Mexico.
These examples are not unusual or in any way peculiar to Mexico.
The situation is similar in virtually every developing country. Public en-
terprises divert the scarce resources of public money and public manage-
ment skills from high-priority uses. Privatization would free those
resources for other, more important tasks such as education, health, and
nutrition.
4. See app., Graph 3.
5. See app., Graph 4.
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2. Privatization Improves Operating Efficiency
In addition to improving the allocation of public resources, privatiza-
tion often improves the operational efficiency of the privatized entities
and thus results in more efficient uses of resources. After privatization, a
Latin American telephone company saved ten million dollars just by ask-
ing its workers to show a picture ID when they came to pick up their pay
checks. Similarly, a Chilean company saved eighty-eight thousand dol-
lars a year by reducing the theft of electricity. These stories can be re-
peated again and again. Even more telling, an in-depth study conducted
by the World Bank on the efficiency effects of privatization in Mexico,
Malaysia, Chile and Great Britain shows consistent net improvements in
efficiency in the companies studied.
There are two factors at the root of this change. One is competition.
John Vickers and George Yarrow argue quite convincingly that if public
enterprises are not unfairly supported, then the efficiency of public and
private companies under competition is the same. In developing coun-
tries, however, public enterprises tend to be unfairly supported. Often,
support takes the form of a monopoly. Public enterprises may be mo-
nopolies even in markets where the potential for competition exists. In
those rare cases where competition is allowed, the playing field is not a
level one. Support can be obvious: subsidies, loans, loan guarantees, or
tax exemptions. But support can also be "hidden:" in one African coun-
try, the enterprises were several years behind in paying their taxes and
their utility bills. They faced no fee or penalty for this behavior. This
"hidden" subsidy would interfere with free competition if the enterprise's
competitors have to pay up and cannot run up arrears.
While some public enterprises are unfairly supported, others are un-
fairly burdened. Recently, a Pakistani manager of a public manufactur-
ing company stated that he must train five workers for every one worker
hired. It appears as if he were running a vocational training school, mak-
ing it difficult for him to compete and hard for the government to insist
on a competitive performance. Similarly, in one East Asian country,
where most of the boards of directors of public enterprises are former
military, the public enterprises are unfairly burdened. While these for-
mer members of the military offer little in the form of managerial assist-
ance, the public enterprises that employed the former generals and
admirals are strapped with supporting their expensive tastes and
lifestyles.
These burdens are important in preventing competition because gov-
ernments are reluctant to let their public enterprises go bankrupt despite
the direct impact on a national budget from losses sustained by public
enterprises. Rather than sustain these losses, governments attempt to
prevent them by eliminating competition. Privatization ends this vicious
circle. By allowing competition, privatization creates pressure for enter-
prises to perform or fail.
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The existence of private property rights is a second reason why priva-
tization results in better performance. Typically profit-oriented owners
push their companies to perform better at lower costs and to be more
service- and client-oriented. Unlike the public owner, private owners are
usually quicker to change management and faster to respond to opportu-
nities. This is due in part to the fact that private owners are motivated by
their own stake in the company and in part to the fact that they are free
of the political constraints that bind government.
3. Privatization Improves Dynamic Efficiency
The effects on dynamic efficiency are a third reason for advocating
privatization. The Chilean telephone company increased the number of
phone lines by seventy-two percent in the three years after it was sold.
The newly privatized Mexican phone company, TELMEX, is laying
down 8,400 miles of fiber-optic cable to link Mexico's fifty-six largest
cities. These are not isolated examples. Research shows that privatiza-
tion has almost always caused an increase in investment and innovation.
The deals themselves are designed to encourage investment-TELMEX
pays ten percent taxes if it invests; twenty-nine percent if it does not.
Moreover, private stake holders have a strong incentive to recognize op-
portunity more readily and seize it more aggressively than public bureau-
crats. By contrast, public enterprise managers are rarely rewarded for
taking risks, even those that are successful, while the penalty for unsuc-
cessful risk-taking is often high. At one point, a Latin American country
jailed the chief executive officers of enterprises that made wrong invest-
ment decisions-wrong from a commercial point of view. Finally, dy-
namic efficiency is improved by the simple fact that the private sector is
also free from the political constraints that can make it hard for public
companies to raise the finances needed for new investment.
B. Reasons Why Governments Often Want to Privatize
As previously stated, there are legitimate reasons why governments
should privatize. Often, however, privatization of government services
are motivated by other concerns. The most important concern motivat-
ing privatization is an attempt to increase available public resources.
Although this is often a reason why governments want to privatize, it
may not be a valid reason why they should.
If priced properly, the sale of a public enterprise will only generate
income in an amount equal to the discounted net present value of any
future income the enterprise would have generated for the government,
plus the scrap value of the enterprise. By selling an enterprise, however,
the government may forfeit some revenues in the future, although it is
quite possible that the taxes collected from the private company will ex-
ceed the resources the public firm would have generated. Thus, in a the-
oretical sense, the argument that privatization creates additional public
resources is illusory.
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Furthermore, an over-emphasis on generating resources can lead to
sacrifices in efficiency. For example, government may not use privatiza-
tion to foster competition if it will reduce the price of the sale. After all,
a buyer will pay more for a monopolistic enterprise that guarantees prof-
its than for a competitive firm that may or may not be profitable. Thus,
although selling or leasing an unprofitable firm may reduce or eliminate a
fiscal drain, where special concessions and protections are extended to
the buyer, the burden on the economy can be considerable and may out-
weigh the benefits of removing the fiscal drain. Attempts to sell non-
viable firms as going concerns may not only invite special protection or
subsidies, but may also lead to subsequent government bail-outs. The
closing and liquidation of firms that do not meet the market test of viabil-
ity provide a better solution.
For the same reasons, selling enterprises through debt/equity swaps as
a motive for privatization should not be overemphasized. This has
proven an effective way of reducing the debt in Argentina, where the sale
of TELECOM reduced the foreign debt by five billion dollars. It should
not be forgotten that debt/equity swaps give the buyer a discount on the
face value of the asset. Under some circumstances, governments may be
just as well off selling enterprises and using the proceeds to buy back the
debt-something Mexico plans to do with the fifteen to twenty billion
dollars it has raised through privatization. Here again, if the government
focuses on maximizing the proceeds from the sale or the amount of debt
retired and loses sight of the efficiency effect, the impact on the economy
could be adverse.
III. How TO PRIVATIZE?
The beneficial effects from privatization flow only from correctly im-
plemented privatizations. Effective privatization can be difficult to ac-
complish, especially for institutionally weak developing countries. A key
concern is how to privatize. There are three fundamental steps in prop-
erly effectuating a privatization.
A. Governments Must Create a Conducive Environment
New Zealand, Britain, Mexico, and Chile are all successful privatizers,
and an important reason for that success is their emphasis on creating an
environment that encourages competition. Chile is one of the most suc-
cessful privatizers, not just in terms of number of enterprises sold but in
terms of the efficiency effects of privatization. This has not always been
the case.
Chile's first attempt at privatization resulted in the sale of enterprises
to groups controlling large banks. The banks subsequently made high-
risk loans to their own companies, and when the economy went through
a downturn, Chile suffered a crisis similar to the recent United States
savings and loan crisis. The government eventually was forced to inter-
[Vol. 60
PRIVA TIZ TION
vene and re-sell the companies in conjunction with appropriate financial
regulation.
Typically, privatization works best when it is only one part of a larger
program of reforms designed to create an environment that promotes effi-
ciency. Such a program usually includes: trade reforms encouraging
competition and export; price reforms liberalizing markets; regulatory re-
forms safeguarding competition by removing obstacles to private entry
and exit; and legal reforms assuring proper disclosure, enforcement of
contracts, and due process. In one developing country, sales of public
enterprises have been conducted despite the fact that they violated the
nation's constitution. In another, the deals concluded ran directly
counter to a recently passed law. Such behavior not only bodes ill for the
future performance of the company and the sustainability of the priva-
tization, but also undermines respect for the rule of law, a critical ele-
ment for the development of an efficient private sector.
B. Governments Must Streamline the Privatization Process
Mexico has successfully sold thousands of enterprises, including some
very large enterprises, with only seven people conducting transactions.
These people held and exercised much power over the enterprises once
they were earmarked for sale. Relying heavily on outside expertise,
mainly from Mexican banks and international investment banks, the de-
cision-making process was centralized in their hands, with the economic
cabinet of the government acting as watchdog. Such a centralized system
might seem subject to abuse, but the check in Mexico was transparency.
Much effort went into explaining why and how privatization was being
offered to the public. The enterprises were sold through auctions, where
at least three bidders were needed for a sale to take place. The terms of
the sale were advertised in the paper. At auction, the government offi-
cials would try to sell a company three times, and if they could not ob-
tain the minimum accounting price they had established, they would
liquidate the company and sell the assets. Not all circumstances or com-
panies lend themselves to this approach, of course. But the underlying
features of the process are well worth emulating: a clear central focal
point with responsibility for the sale, the power to match that responsi-
bility, a lean process without a lot of actors, and a transparent process
that cannot be easily corrupted or diverted.
An important factor in transparency is valuation. A realistic valuation
is necessary to set a floor price as a basis for negotiations and as a check
that the deal is legitimate. Thus, when outsiders judge the privatization
process they often compare the sales price with the so-called "value" of
the enterprise. Determining the value of a public enterprise, however,
may be difficult.
A privatizing enterprise can be thought of as a commodity that has
never before been on the market. Therefore, how do you decide its value
in the absence of a market test? Even in the United Kingdom, there has
1992]
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been much controversy over the sales prices of public enterprises. The
situation is far worse in developing countries, where the accounts may be
out of date and inaccurate-the one telecom company was sold without
even having a balance sheet for the year prior to sale. Often, the book
value of a company bears no resemblance to the company's market value,
especially if the company has a poor track record, redundant layers of
employees, and a host of operating problems. Governments often are
forced to rely on an independent body to assess the value of the com-
pany, leading sometimes to very unrealistic results. For example, an in-
dependent government agency valued an African shipyard at $6.2 million
despite the fact that 1990 profits only amounted to $3600. Surely, the
government would encounter many difficulties in an attempt to sell this
enterprise for six million dollars. Therefore, it is crucial to establish an
accurate and realistic value as a floor price.
Expert advice plays an important role in the privatization process. In-
terestingly, government officials everywhere, even in developed countries
such as Canada, report difficulty in using technical expertise properly.
This is due in part to the unrealistic expectations governments have
about what advisors can and should accomplish. An investment banker
active in the Mexican and Argentine privatization programs suggested
that in his view, the role of the investment bank in privatization is to give
a signal to the client government of what the market will or will not
tolerate, thereby establishing a sort of market test to help privatizing gov-
ernments negotiate the best deal. Governments, however, often do not
envision the role of investment bankers the same way. Governments
tend to expect their advisors will both tell them what the market will
bear, as well as advise them of what is best for the welfare of the public at
large. That, however, is not the role of a successful investment banker.
Investment bankers cannot be asked to protect the broader public in-
terest. Governments must do so. This may require close scrutiny of the
advice received from investment bankers. For example, investment
bankers have suggested raising the tariffs charged by Canadian-regulated
state enterprises to a level above the efficiency price as a way of attracting
buyers and getting a higher price for the enterprises. Had this advice
been followed, the customers of these Canadian companies, Canadian
consumers, and investors would have suffered adverse consequences.
Advisors play different roles. Governments of privatizing countries must
assess what technical advice is necessary, and hire a team of different
kinds of advisors, including people who can help them design regulatory
and policy frameworks to maximize the benefits from privatization to the
economy as a whole.
C. Governments Must Prepare the Enterprise for Privatization
To attract buyers who are willing both to pay a reasonable price for an
entity and to invest in improving the efficiency of the entity, governments
must make the public enterprises more attractive. This may require
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much preparation by the involved government. Though this does not
require new investment in the company, it may require eliminating debt
from the enterprise's balance sheet.
Many public enterprises are burdened with debt as a result of previous
ill-advised investment programs. Few buyers want to put money into
debt repayment when they are buying a company. Contingent liabilities,
such as pension funds, large severance pay agreements, or claims for en-
vironmental damage, are greater deterrents to privatization due to the
inestimable scope of these liabilities. Removal of some of these liabilities
has proven advantageous to privatization in East Germany, where the
Treuhand has paid ninety percent of previously incurred damages.
Though painful, layoffs are another form of preparation. Successful
privatizers have tended to lay off redundant workers before sale. The
work force of British public enterprises was sharply reduced before any
sales and increased afterwards. In preparation for the franchising of the
Argentinean rail freight system, 90,000 people, one-third of the employ-
ees, are being laid off. Government must deal with redundant labor be-
cause many buyers will shy away from enterprises where they must
undertake layoffs. In addition, government can better develop a social
safety net to help ease the social costs of unemployment. Although un-
employment is sometimes cited as a result of privatization, it is not.
Rather, unemployment results from the reduction of redundancies and
the shut-down of non-viable enterprises. Any reform program that aims
to increase efficiency, whether it changes ownership or not, may lead to
layoffs of redundant workers.
Government must also work with the labor force to win acceptance of
the sale. Jamaica and Chile used sales of shares to workers partly as a
way to increase worker acceptance of the sales. Chile sold between five
and ten percent of the shares of enterprises directly to workers-who
could get an advance on their severance pay to buy shares-at a discount
with a repurchase guarantee at the time of retirement. Some analysts
suggest the sale to workers may have earned a higher price for Chilean
companies sold because investors felt that a worker stake in the company
reduced the risk of re-nationalization.
A third form of preparation that governments must contend with is
the break-up of monopolies. The East German privatization agency, the
Treuhand, started out with 6100 firms to privatize. A year later, after
1300 companies had been sold, the Treuhand had 9000 companies to
privatize-largely as a result of the breakup of monopolies. Clearly, gov-
ernments will want to assure that large monopolies and oligopolies that
could discourage competition are not sold intact. Only government can
accomplish this. No private buyer would gratuitously relinquish its mo-
nopoly position.
CONCLUSION
The present interest in privatization is no fad. What we now see is a
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restructuring of the balance between the public and private sectors. Dur-
ing the 1960s and 1970s, there was reliance on government and consider-
able faith in what government could achieve. Development strategies
assumed that there were many failures in the market that government
could address in addition to means by which the public sector could ac-
celerate development. As a result, public enterprises were created to run
the "commanding heights" of the economy. Public enterprises were also
created to deal with social ills by generating employment, investing in
backward regions, and by charging "reasonable" prices to poorer con-
sumers. Lessons have been learned, however, and today's strategies re-
flect these lessons. Markets fail, but so do governments. The public
enterprises were unable to meet all their ambitious goals; instead, they
sometimes, undermined the very objectives they were created to serve.
Low fixed prices set to help lower income people led to enterprise defi-
cits. The deficits in turn led to government bail-outs, financed either
through taxes or inflation. Both taxes and inflation hit the poorer citizen
harder than the rich. "Model" employment practices led to high wages,
well above the average wage, for public enterprise employees and en-
trenched labor forces who were often not employed productively. If
higher labor costs were passed on as higher enterprise prices, it often
crippled downstream enterprises in the country, thereby reducing new
investment and job creation elsewhere in the economy. Many public en-
terprises created secure, well-paying jobs for the few at the expense of the
many.
Developing countries have recognized the flaws in the earlier approach
and are creating a new division of labor between the public and private
sector. Privatization of assets is one way to achieve this new division.
Privatization should be designed to further three goals: (1) improving
the use of public resources, (2) improving operating efficiency, and (3)
improving dynamic efficiency.
These goals are not automatic results of privatization; governments
will need to focus on how they privatize. Specifically, they will need to:
(1) create the right environment by undertaking other reforms designed
to encourage competition and growth; (2) create a strong, lean, central-
ized, and transparent process by setting up a small yet effective focal
point to privatize while keeping the process public and fair; and (3) pre-
pare the enterprises for privatization by making the necessary changes to
assure that the privatization works to enhance efficiency, while at the
same time working to cope with any unemployment that may result.
The World Bank aims to help developing countries that are attempting
to increase efficiency and cost effectiveness through privatization to do so
successfully. It has approved and supported over 140 projects in member
countries. The World Bank acts as a catalyst for privatization, helping to
finance the technical advice. It also helps countries put privatization in
its context and supports a broader program of reforms.
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